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Arbitration Agreements: When do Employees Waive
Their Wrights?*
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, many questions have arisen
regarding employment agreements that contain clauses requiring the
mandatory arbitration of employment disputes. These provisions are
commonly found in employment contracts, free-standing arbitration
agreements, employee handbooks, and other similar documents. 1 Until
1999 mandatory arbitration provisions were also included in securities
exchange registration forms. 2 Such provisions in an employment
contract require that employment dispute claims, such as discrimination
and wrongful termination, be subject to arbitration rather than heard in
a judicial forum. Arbitration clauses have become especially popular
because arbitration is typically less expensive, faster, and less formal
than court proceedings. 3 However, members of the legal and business
communities have been perplexed by the legal issues surrounding the
construction and enforcement of these mandatory arbitration clauses,
specifically where alleged violations of statutory rights are at issue.
This confusion stems largely from two United States Supreme
Court decisions, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver4 and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 5 The Court in Gardner-Denver held that
an employee's statutory right to a trial under Title VII, for his claim of

' Copyright~ 1999 by Michelle R. Mitchell
1. See John P. Furfaro & Marury B. Josephson, Employment Arbitration, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 11, 1997 at 3.
2. After much pressure from plaintiffs, civil rights groups, and Congress, as of January 1,
1999, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) no longer requires its securities
industry employees to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims. Peter M. Pranken &
Jeffrey D. Williams, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Courts and in the Real World, A.L.l.
ADV. EMP. L & LlTIG., Dec. 3, 1998, at *18. Employment discrimination claims in violation of a
statute will be eligible for arbitration only where the parties agree to arbitrate after the claim has
arisen. /d. Brokerage houses are not required to follow suit. /d. The amendment does not apply to
claims filed before 1999. See Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999).
3. Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Landenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993).
4. 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974).
5. 500 U.S. 20, IllS. Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1991).
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wrongful discharge as a result of a racially discriminatory employment
practice, was not precluded by prior submission of his claim to final
arbitration, as provided for by a nondiscrimination clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement. 6 This decision has frequently been
interpreted to mean that arbitration cannot be compelled in
discrimination cases. 7 Several years later, the Supreme Court decided
Gilmer, holding that an individual's termination-of-employment claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) could be
subjected under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the securities
registration Form U-4 the employee was required to sign as a condition
of employment. 8 Several courts have interpreted this decision as
overruling Gardner-Denver and requiring the arbitration of
discrimination claims. 9
The contradiction between the two cases is apparent. In GardnerDenver, an alleged violation of an employee's rights under Title VII,
which resulted in a discrimination claim, was not subject to a waiver;
while in Gilmer, the right to a judicial forum for a discrimination claim
arising under the ADEA could be waived by entering into an agreement
requiring the mandatory arbitration of employment disputes. 10 In light
of this conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Wright v.
Universal Maritime Services Corp. 11 Many interested parties anxiously
awaited the Court's decision in Wright, hoping for a resolution to the
Gilmer/Gardner-Denver conflict. These parties anticipated receiving
additional guidance from the Court on the use of arbitration agreements
and the possible waiver of statutory rights. 12 However, the Supreme
Court's decision in Wright did not provide a clear resolution to this
conflict. The Court held that the collective bargaining agreement's
(CBAs) general arbitration clause at issue did not require an employee
to use the arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because the language of the

6. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 36.
7. Nancy Erika Smith, Is the Bell Tolling for Mandatory Arbitration?, 196 N.J. LAWYER.
28 (April 1999).
8. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
9. Carol E. Neesemann, Resistance to Arbitration is Evident in First Circuit's 'Rosenberg'
Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1999.
10. Wright v. Universal Maritime Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d
361 (1998).
11. 121 F.3d 702 (1997), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 391 (vacating and remanding the lower
Court's decision).
12. See Jennifer Click, Arbitration Agreements, Benefit Plan Changes are Among Issues on
Supreme Court's Docket, 17 HR NEWS (Oct. 1998) at 1,4.
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contract was not specific enough for Mr. Wright to know that he had
waived his statutory rights by agreeing to the employment contract. 13
In its decision in Wright, the Court addressed a number of
important issues regarding arbitration clauses, including the confusion
involved in the Gardner-Denver and Gilmer decisions, the presumption
of arbitrability, and the "clear and unmistakable" standard for waiving
statutory rights. Additionally, the opinion addressed such issues as the
distinction between individual and union-negotiated rights, and that
between statutory and CBA rights. 14
Unfortunately, Wright did not address a number of issues of
concern to those who must work with or under arbitration clauses. The
issues left unaddressed include the validity of a union-negotiated
waiver, and thus the enforceability of such a waiver (as appear to be at
issue in both Gilmer and Gardner-Denver), the applicability of the
Federal Arbitration Agreement (FAA) to this case, and the validity of
CBA pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination
claims. Moreover, Wright does not enter into the realm where a CBA
clearly encompasses employment discrimination claims, nor into the
realm of areas outside collective bargaining. 15 The exclusion of these
topics suggests that the scope of Wright is limited, and that while the
holding has provided some guidance, it has also left several questions
unanswered.
Both addressed and unaddressed issues in Wright are significant in
that they seem to send a message that Gilmer did not overrule GardnerDenver. The Court's opinion and the tense judicial climate in which the
decision was made reveal the difficulty courts are having in balancing
the protection of statutory rights and the enforcement of employment
contract provisions. This note looks at the questions Wright answered
and discusses the guidance Wright provides on certain issues regarding
arbitration agreements. The analysis also discusses the decision's
limitations and other concerns the legal and business communities
continue to face where arbitration agreements are concerned. Part II of
this note outlines the background and development of the law regarding
mandatory arbitration clauses. It also provides examples of different
circuits' interpretations of the conflict between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer.
Part III gives the facts of Wright and discusses the analysis used by
the Supreme Court in deciding the matter. Part IV suggests that the

13. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 393.
14. /d.
15. /d.
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Court narrowly defined the issue 16 and thereby avoided addressing
certain issues relating to the enforceability of arbitration agreements,
but that even within this narrow construction, the Supreme Court has
sent the message that Gilmer did not overrule Gardner-Denver. Rather,
the Court's decision seems to limit Gilmer's application. The analysis
further suggests that there is still some confusion surrounding both the
construction and the enforceability of arbitration agreements that
employers, employees, and lawyers should recognize. Part V concludes
that while arbitration is often a preferred method of dispute resolution,
it can result in the loss of certain rights and privileges, and therefore,
should only be used when it is appropriate for the particular matter at
hand and when the arbitration procedure is knowingly and voluntarily
entered into by the employee.
II. BACKGROUND

As suggested previously, the Wright decision comes in the midst of
a variety of legal precedents regarding mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts. Specifically, the conflict between GardnerDenver and Gilmer is of extreme importance. Cremin v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. 17 illustrates this conflict and provides an
example of the belief that Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver. Cremin,
addressed the conflict between Gilmer and Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Lai, 18 which largely the Cremin court considered to be in line with the
holding in Gardner-Denver. 19 The Cremin court said:
Regardless of any personal views this Court may have regarding
Gilmer, we are obligated, as a district court, to give it full force.
Although this Court is sympathetic to the Lai approach, we find the
substantial authority refusing to follow Lai is more in keeping with the
principles Gilmer espoused. 20

16. The Court made its decision on the basis of the arbitration agreement's construction,
particularly the Collective Bargaining Agreement's (CBA) general terms. The contract provision's
general terms were not sufficiently clear as to indicate to the Court or to Wright that he would
waive statutory rights by entering into the contract.
17. 957 F. Supp 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
18. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9"' Cir. 1994). In Lai the Ninth Circuit held
that two employees, who signed U-4 forms containing arbitration agreements, could not be
compelled to arbitrate their sexual discrimination and abuse claims under Title VII, because they
did not "knowingly enter into any agreement to arbitrate employment disputes." !d. at 1301.
19. The Court looked at Congressional intent for Title VII claims. The House Report used
was based on Gardner-Denver. The Court notes that Gardner-Denver was distinguished in Gilmer.
See Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1460.
20. Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1475.
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This language demonstrates the tension between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer and indicates a commonly held notion that Gilmer is the current
controlling law.
The Fourth Circuit has also adopted this belief, as illustrated by its
decision in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, lnc. 21 In Austin
the Fourth Circuit followed Gilmer, holding that a collective bargaining
agreement that explicitly called for the arbitration of gender and
disability discrimination subjected Austin's Title VII and ADA claims
to mandatory arbitration. 22 Furthermore, using Gilmer as its guide, the
Fourth Circuit said that because Austin did not first submit her claim to
arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, she could not
bring the lawsuit. 23 The Austin court specifically noted that "by
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded it by statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial forum. " 24 Holding fast to
Gilmer, the Austin decision follows Gilmer. It rejects the principal
concern in Gardner-Denver, that arbitration is an "inappropriate forum
for the resolution of Title VII statutory rights. " 25 Austin, therefore,
suggests that Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver, even though the
Court's opinion in Gilmer explicitly distinguishes the two cases. 26
Specifically, the Court in Gilmer indicates that Gilmer is different from
Gardner-Denver, because the latter involved the issue of whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded the judicial resolution of
statutory claims where the contract was in the form of a CBA, and was

21. 78 F.3d 875 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
22. !d. at 877-78.
23. !d.
24. !d. at 880 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
25. Austin, 78 F.3d at 875 (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56).
26. The Court in Gilmer states:
There are several important distinctions between the Gardner-Denver line of cases and
the case before us. First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of
an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different
issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial
resolution of statutory claims .... Second, because arbitration in those cases occurred
in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants were represented by
their unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore was the
tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a concern not
applicable to the present case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA,
which, as discussed above reflects "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 625).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35; See also Pryner v. Tractor Supply 109 F.3d 354, 364 (7"' Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 294 (1997), (reiterating this distinction). In light of the distinction, the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Austin seems to directly contradict the intent of the Gilmer decision as
illustrated by the Court's distinguishing the Gardner-Denver line of cases from Gilmer.
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not decided under the FAA. 27 Thus, it is interesting and somewhat
confusing that the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to Austin. 28
The Supreme Court also refused to grant certiorari to Duffield v.
Robertson-Stevens & Co. 29 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued an opinion rejecting the Fourth Circuit's holding in Austin,
calling the Austin decision "troubling. " 30 The Ninth Circuit held that
employees who sign arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment cannot be compelled to arbitrate Title VII discrimination
claims. 31 In Duffield, new employees were required to sign employment
agreements that provided for the mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes, including Title VII claims. 32 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
overturned the lower court's decision that the claims were arbitrable.
The Duffield court found that one of Congress' primary goals in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA) was to "strengthen" Title
VII, by making it easier to bring and prove lawsuits; by increasing the
judicial remedies available to compensate victims of discrimination; and
by providing a right to damages and trial by jury. 33 The Ninth Circuit
also concluded that the new provisions in the 1991 Act suggested that it
was not Congress' intent to have Title VII claims arbitrated. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit followed the holding in Gardner-Denver, that an
employee could not be barred from bringing Title VII claims into a
judicial forum by an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. 34 The Ninth Circuit stated, "Congress in no way intended to
incorporate Gilmer's holding into Title VII, or to authorize compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims. " 35 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit,
Congress' clearly expressed intent regarding compulsory arbitration
was in direct opposition to Gilmer.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duffield directly
contradicts the Fourth Circuit's decision in Austin; yet, the Supreme
27. !d.
28. The court in Wright notes that in contrast to Wright the CBA in Austin containted its
own specific antidiscrimination provision. Wright, 119 S.Ct at 396-97. This specific provision
may help account for the Courts denial of certitorari in light of the "clear and unmistakable"
standard discussed herein.
29. 144 F.3d 1182 (9"' Cir. 1998).
30. !d. at 1192.
31. !d. The employees had to sign U-4 Forms as conditions of employment in the securities
industry. Certain provisions in the form contained mandatory arbitration clauses for employment
disputes. The signing of these agreements are no longer required. See discussion supra note 2.
32. !d.
33. !d. at 1193 (referring to H.R. REP. No. 40(1), at 30 (1991); H.R.REP. No. 40(11), at 14, (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96).
34. !d.
35. !d. at 1195 (noting that the CRA of 1991 was passed almost simultaneously with the
issuance of the Gilmer decision).
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Court denied certiorari in both cases. It is also significant that the
Fourth Circuit decided Wright according to the precedent it set forth in
Austin and the Supreme Court agreed to hear Wright. Perhaps the
Supreme Court recognized the need to address the conflict between the
Austin and Duffield lines of decisions and chose to do so by granting
certiorari to Wright. By granting cert, the Supreme Court seems to be
sending a message that Gilmer is limited in its facts and that the Fourth
Circuit should move away from a per se enforcement of arbitration
agreements, especially where collective bargaining agreements are
concerned.

III. WRIGHT DID NOT WAIVE HIS STATUTORY RIGHTS
Wright v. Universal Maritime Services Corp. involved Wright, a
longshoreman and member of the International Longshoremen's
Association, AFL-CIO (Union), who was subject to a collectivebargaining agreement (CBA) and a Longshore Seniority Plan, both of
which contained arbitration clauses. When Wright injured his right heel
and his back while working, he sought compensation from his employer
for the permanent disability and in a settlement received $250,000 plus
$10,000 for attorney's fees. He later returned to the Union hiring hall,
asked to be referred to work, and worked for four stevedoring
companies. When the companies found out that he had previously
settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the Union that
they would not accept Wright for employment, because a person
certified as permanently disabled was not qualified to perform
longshore work under the CBA. Although Wright failed to file a timely
grievance, as was the expected procedure under the CBA, the Union
advised Wright to file a claim in federal court under the ADA. He filed
a claim in district court, alleging that the stevedoring companies and the
SCSA violated the ADA by denying him work. 36
The district court dismissed the case without prejudice because
Wright failed to pursue the arbitration procedure provided by the
CBA. 37 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit followed its previous decision in
Austin v. Owens-Brockwal 8 and upheld the lower court's decision. The
Fourth Circuit in Austin held:
Whether the dispute arises under a contract of employment growing
out of securities registration application, a simple employment
contract, or a collective bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet

36. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 394.
37. !d.
38. 78 F.3d 875 (4m Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
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been made to arbitrate the dispute[;] [s]o long as the agreement is
voluntary, it is valid, and ... it should be enforced. 39

This language suggests that Austin rejects the Gardner-Denver decision
in favor of Gilmer, resulting in a per se rule requiring individuals to
waive their federal statutory rights if they enter into an arbitration
agreement voluntarily. Based upon this rule, Wright was required to
arbitrate his claim. 40
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the Fourth Circuit's decision. 41 The Court reasoned that Wright's claim
was a statutory claim under the ADA, not a CBA or a contractual right
(as in Gardner-Denver) and that the statutory claim was not subject to a
presumption of arbitrability. 42 The Court further stated that any CBA
requirement to arbitrate must be "clear and unmistakable. " 43 Because
the arbitration requirement did not meet this standard, Wright did not
waive his right to have his claim heard in a judicial forum. In so
limiting the scope of the issue at hand, the Supreme Court avoided
ruling on the issue of the enforceability of such a waiver.
IV. THE WAIVER OF FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS IN ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS

In Wright, the Supreme Court addressed several important issues
regarding arbitration agreements. Overall, these issues should have a
significant effect on case law regarding arbitration. However, since the
scope of the decision is narrow, the Wright decision is limited in its
application and implications.
A. The Conflict Between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer

The Court acknowledged in Wright the "tension" between its
decision in Gardner-Denver and that in Gilmer. 44 At issue in GardnerDenver and Gilmer, and the essence of the conflict between the two, is
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement where violations of
federal statutory rights are alleged. Gardner-Denver held that an
employee's rights under Title VII are not subject to waiver, while
Gilmer held that the right to present an ADEA claim in a judicial forum
39. !d. at 885.
40. See Wright, 119 S.Ct at 394.
41. !d. at 397.
42. !d. at 395-96. "Presumption of arbitrability" means that if there is a possibility that an
arbitration clause may cover an asserted claim, then the claim is presumed to be arbitrable, or
subject to arbitration. !d.
43. !d. at 396.
44. !d. at 395.
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could be waived. 45 Respondent's argument and the Fourth Circuit
decision suggest that Gilmer had overruled Gardner-Denver. 46
Specifically, the stevedoring companies argued that Gilmer had
"sufficiently undermined Gardner-Denver that a union can waive
employees' rights to a judicial forum. " 47
However, the Supreme Court in issuing Gilmer did not indicate that
it overruled Gardner-Denver, and as such, no express declaration was
made in Wright either. Nor did the Court indicate that Wright overruled
either of these two precedents. In fact, the Court did not reach the issue
of the enforceability of a waiver of the right to a judicial forum for
hearing civil rights claims. The Court explained:
Petitioner and the United States amicus would have us reconcile the
lines of authority by maintaining that federal forum rights cannot be
waived in union-negotiated CBAs even if they can be waived in
individually executed contracts-a distinction that assuredly finds
support in the text of Gilmer. 48

But the Court continued to explain that the Justices "find it unnecessary
to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver,
since it is apparent ... that no such waiver has occurred. " 49
Thus, from this ruling in Wright we find that prior to discussing the
enforceability of a waiver, courts must look at whether a waiver has
actually occurred. The Court's decision provides a "clear and
unmistakable" standard for deciding whether a waiver has occurred. 5°
Even though the Court found that Wright had not waived his
statutory rights and did not address the issue of enforcing such waivers,
the Supreme Court's decision in Wright sends the message that Gilmer
did not overrule Gardner-Denver. In fact, Wright reiterates the
distinction between the two cases. Wright follows Gardner-Denver by
allowing Wright to have his statutory claim heard in a judicial forum.
The decision limits Gilmer by suggesting that individual statutory rights
should be considered separate from CBA-conferred rights. The decision
45. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
46. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 394.
47. !d. at 395.
48. !d. The agreement in question in Gardner-Denver was a collective bargaining
agreement, while the agreement in Gilmer was not.
49. !d. (emphasis added).
50. Since Wright does not address the issue of enforceability, the decision is limited in that
it does not resolve some important issues that frequently arise in the courts today. For example, it
is unclear whether ADEA and ADA claims differ from Title VII claims regarding the
enforceability of a waiver of the right to take civil rights matters into a judicial forum. In GardnerDenver the Court held that Title VII rights could not be waived, while in Gilmer the Court held
that ADEA rights could be waived. However, both are considered statutory rights, so perhaps no
distinction need be made.
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in Wright also rejects the per se standard and replaces it with the "clear
and unmistakable" standard. 51
Although the court found it unnecessary to enter into the realm of
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the Wright opinion
distinguishes the Gilmer and Gardner-Denver decisions in light of one
contract being individually negotiated and the other being the result of a
CBA. This distinction is helpful in reconciling the conflict between the
two cases. The different kinds of employment contracts account at least
partially for the different holdings. However, one can only speculate as
to the Court's intention, since the Wright Court declined to address the
issue of waiver enforceability. 52
The Supreme Court may also be sending this message by denying
certiori to Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. 53 In Duffield, the Ninth
Circuit held that employees who sign arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment cannot be compelled to arbitrate Title VII
discrimination claims. This refusal suggests that the Supreme Court
may not always uphold mandatory arbitration of statutory claims as
provided in certain employment agreements. Employers, employees,
and legal practitioners should be mindful of decisions as such. 54
B. "Presumption of Arbitrability"

The Court's reasoning behind its decision in Wright addresses the
issue of a "presumption of arbitrability." The Supreme Court had
previously found a presumption of arbitrability in section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 55 The Wright Court,
quoting from a previous decision, stated that for collective-bargaining
agreements "there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that
'[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. "' 56
If a possibility exists that the arbitration clause may cover the
asserted claim, then it is presumed to be subject to arbitration. The
51. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 396.
52. !d. at 395.
53. 144 F.3d 1182 (9'" Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct 445 (1998).
54. This trend may upset some employers because in the past few years arbitration
agreements have become popular in employment contracts as a means ensuring a less expensive
and more efficient forum for resolving employment disputes.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
56. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395 (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582-3 (1960))).
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Court, however, went on to state that the principle rationale behind the
presumption of arbitrability was that arbitrators are in a better position
than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA, but that the presumption
does not reach beyond this rationale. 57 This statement suggests that the
converse is true; when the claim does not fall under the terms of a
CBA, an arbitrator is not necessarily in the better position to decide the
claim.
In Wright the claim arises out of the ADA, not out of an
employment contract containing a CBA. As stated by the Court, the
issue at hand in Wright "ultimately concerns not the application or
interpretation of any CBA, but the meaning of a federal statute. " 58
Simply stated, in Wright there is not a question of whether an arbitrator
is in a better position to address CBA claims. The judicial courts are
those who are most familiar with the adjudication of statutory claims
because there has not been an alleged violation of a CBA right. Thus,
the Court suggests that the statutory right asserted under the ADA is
distinguished from a right conferred by the CBA, and therefore, is not
subject to the presumption of arbitrability as the CBA-conferred right
would.

C. A Statutory Right
The Court's indication that the claim in Wright is a statutory claim
arising under the ADA and not a claim arising from an alleged violation
of a CBA-conferred right is significant. When this distinction is applied
to Wright, the Court concludes that Wright may not be qualified for his
position as the CBA requires, but he may prevail if the refusal to hire
him violated the ADA. 59 Additionally, even if the CBA created a right
parallel to the statutory right, the question for the arbitrator would be
"not what the parties have agreed to, but what federal law requires; and
that is not a question which should be presumed to be included within
the arbitration agreement. " 60 Thus, the Court suggests that statutorily
conferred rights and the applicable federal law within a CBA should be
and are best heard in a judicial forum.
This issue is a primary distinction between Gilmer and GardnerDenver, as the Court in Gilmer pointed out. 61 This distinction suggests
that Gilmer is limited and further suggests that where collective

57. /d.
58. /d.
59. /d.
60. /d.
61. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
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bargaining agreements are concerned, a Gardner-Denver based
approach may be more appropriate.
Justice Hall's dissenting opinion in Austin distinguishes between
collective bargaining agreement rights and individual statutory rights as
well. Justice Hall suggests that the context of the case, specifically
whether there is a collective bargaining agreement, is the key factor in
deciding which precedent to use, Gilmer or Gardner-Denver. 62 He
suggests that the contractual rights under a collective bargaining
agreement are different from independent statutory rights and that
independent statutory rights cannot be waived like the right to strike,
which is a collective activity. Therefore, he disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Austin and probably would have agreed with the
Supreme Court in Wright.
D. The Federal Arbitration Act

In deciding arbitration agreement matters, courts often look to the
Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) presumption of arbitrability, 63
especially after the presumption's enforcement in Gilmer. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Wright said that its ruling in Gilmer gave heavy
consideration to the federal policy favoring arbitration in the FAA. 64
The Court also stated that "statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA. " 65 The FFA
was first passed in 1925 and then reenacted in 1947 to reverse the
"longstanding judicial hostility" to arbitration that the American judicial
system had carried over from English common law. 66 In essence, the
FAA gives arbitration agreements the same legal standing as other
contracts, so that contract law governs whether an agreement to
arbitrate has been made and whether it is enforceable. 67
The Court in Wright declined to address the issue of whether the
FAA applied, but the decision seems to reject the arbitrability
presumption. The Court did not address this issue because the
presumption of arbitrability in the Labor Management Relations Act,
which the Court did address, is the same as that of the FAA. 68 Also, the
Fourth Circuit held elsewhere that the FAA did not apply to CBAs. 69

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86 (Hall, J. dissenting).
See Gilmer 500 U.S. at 24.
See Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 394-95.
/d. at 395
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
/d.
Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395 n.l.
See Austin, 78 F.3d at 879 (referring to Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local
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The Court noted further that respondents did not argue the issue of
FAA applicability before the Court. 7 For these reasons, the Court in
Wright did not spend much time discussing FAA applicability.
Although the issue was not discussed in Wright, it is still a significant
issue in deciding whether arbitration agreements are valid and
enforceable.
While federal policy under the FAA may favor arbitration, Wright
makes an effort to protect individual statutory rights, especially the
individual rights of those whose employment contracts are negotiated
collectively rather than individually. The following paragraphs
demonstrate the standard the Court used to protect individual statutory
rights.

°

E. The "Clear and Unmistakable" Standard
In order to protect individual statutory rights, the Court in Wright
provides the standard for mandatory arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements. Specifically, the Court maintains that "any
CBA requirement to arbitrate [a statutory claim] must be particularly
clear. " 71 The Court stood by its previous assertion that, in order for
courts to infer that the parties intend to waive a statutorily protected
right, the waiver must be "explicitly stated" or "clear and
unmistakable. " 72 The Court indicated that this standard should be
applied to union-negotiated waivers of employees' statutory rights to a
judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination. 73 The Court
found that the CBA in Wright did not meet the "clear and
unmistakable" standard because it was "very general" in that the
arbitration clause only provided for the arbitration of "[m]atters under
dispute" and did not include a statutory anti-discrimination
requirement. 74 The Longshoresman Seniority Plan was also very
general and thus failed to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard
as well. 75 Therefore, the Court determined that Wright had not waived
his rights to adjudicate his ADA claim in federal court.
The Court's "clear and unmistakable" standard is similar to other
courts' standards. The Supreme Court seems to be concerned that
employees will waive their individual statutory rights without knowing
Union, 392 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1993)).
70. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395 n.l.
71. /d. at 396 (emphasis added).
72. /d. (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708).
73. /d.
74. /d.
75. /d. at 397.
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what they are forbearing. For this reason, standards such as the
"knowing and voluntary" and "clear and unmistakable" exist. After a
knowing waiver has occurred, the courts may then move on to resolve
the enforceability issue of such waivers.
F. Union-negotiated Waivers

With regard to the issue of union-negotiated rights, the Court does
not explicitly state whether Gardner-Denver's prohibition of a union
waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer. Instead, the
Court indicates that "Gardner-Denver at least stands for the proposition
that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be
protected against a less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA. " 76 Thus,
the focus of the Court's decision is on whether the arbitration clause
was sufficiently clear to indicate to Wright that his statutory
discrimination claims would be subject to arbitration, rather than heard
in a judicial forum. The Court limits the "clear and unmistakable"
standard, however, to CBA requirements to arbitrate and unionnegotiated waivers of statutory rights by distinguishing its decision in
Wright from that in Gilmer. "Gilmer involved an individual's waiver of
his own rights, rather than a union's waiver of the rights of represented
employees-and hence the clear and unmistakable standard was not
applicable .•m
By limiting the "clear and unmistakable" standard to collectivelynegotiated agreements, the Court intends to provide protection for
individuals who do not negotiate their own employment contracts and
therefore are not in a position to protect their individual rights. 78 The
standard is intended to ensure that union-negotiated agreements
containing a waiver of statutory rights make clear by the contract
language that such a right is being waived. The Court did not specify
which standard would apply to individually negotiated contracts, but
suggested that it would not be the same. 79 In fact, the Court's statement
distinguishing Wright from Gilmer suggests that individually negotiated
contracts probably would not be held to as high of a standard. 80 This
76. /d. at 397.
77. Id. at 396.
78. See generally Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F.Supp 569, 574 (D. Conn.
1997). This case indicates one court's concern for protecting the individual.
79. 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (1994). Cf. Gardner, 425 U.S. at 51-52; (quoting Senator Dole).
If the only issue is whether the arbitration agreement is collectively or individually negotiated then
it would appear that the latter standard may not be upheld by the Supreme Court.
80. Perhaps this distinction is because individuals are in a better position to protect their
own rights when they negotiate a contract than individuals are when the contracts are negotiated
collectively, specifically by a union.
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distinction is significant in the wake of the Ninth Circuit's decisions,
particularly those in which the Ninth Circuit has extended the
"knowingly" standard to individually-negotiated employment contracts,
as is the case in Prudential v. Lai. 81
In Lai the court found that employees did not have to arbitrate
sexual harassment and discrimination claims as provided for in the
Standard Applications for Securities Industry Registration, or U-4
forms they were required to sign for employment with Prudential
Insurance Co., because the individuals did not "knowingly" enter into
any agreement to arbitrate their disputes. 82 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that "a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to forego her statutory
remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit
such disputes to arbitration. " 83 This decision was based largely on the
court's finding that Congress intended arbitration to be used by those
employees who "knowingly" and "voluntarily" gave up their rights to
bring their claims to a judicial forum. 84 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in
Renteria v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America85 refused to enforce
the mandatory arbitration of a sexual harassment claim where the
employee did not "knowingly" waive her right to sue when she signed
the U-4 as a condition of her employment.
Gilmer set forth a significant distinction between standards required
for individually, as opposed to collectively-negotiated contracts.
Indeed, the "knowingly" and "voluntarily" standard certainly applies to
collectively negotiated agreements, yet the standard may be too high for
an individually-negotiated employment contract. Thus, there is an
argument that the Ninth Circuit may have applied too lenient a standard
where indiviudal employment contracts were concerned. 86 However,
there is perhaps a stronger argument that the U-4 forms should be
subject to the same standard as collectively negotiated contracts since
the employees are required as a condition of employment to sign these
agreements and essentially may not negotiate their individual rights.
Essentially both the "knowingly" standard applied in Lai and
Renteria and the "clear and unmistakable" standard applied in Wright
are significant in their efforts to protect individual rights. Employees
and employers operating under contracts where the prospective
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
ld. q. Gardner, 425 U.S. at 51-52. (quoting Senator Dole).
Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
113 F.3d 1104 (9"' Cir. 1997).
See Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997), cert
denied, 522 U.S. 915 (1997) for an example of a stricter standard applied to an individuallynegotiated contract.
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employee was not in a position to protect his or her rights prior to
entering into an arbitration agreement must be cautious of the
arbitration clauses embodied in the employment agreements. The
provisions must be clear enough that the Court does not have to infer
that a waiver was intended at the time the contract was negotiated and
signed. Further, it should be "clear and unmistakable" from the
wording of the employment agreement that the employees intended to
waive the right to have their employment discrimination claims heard in
a judicial forum. 87

G. Courts Look for a Balance
In addition to the limitations mentioned above, the Wright decision
is limited because it does not address instances where a CBA clearly
encompasses employment discrimination claims. 88 Nor does the
decision address areas outside collective bargaining or the
enforceability of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims in a CBA. Furthermore, Wright does not solve
the conflict between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.
The on-going tension between the two decisions suggests a struggle
to find a balance between enforcing arbitration agreements and
protecting individual rights. Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 89
provides an example of a court's trying to reach this balance. The
circuit court's desire for balance is revealed in the following discussion:
The concerns expressed in Gardner-Denver and Barrantine strongly
suggest that a collective-bargaining agreement can never require
employees to submit individual statutory claims to grievance
procedures. It is possible, however, to adopt a more limited view of
the Court's holdings in those cases. Under this view, the exclusion of
individual statutory claims from the collective-bargaining process
would take the form of a rebuttable presumption rather than an
absolute requirement: that is, the courts would assume that individual
statutory claims were excluded from grievance procedures unless the
collective bargaining agreement expressly provided otherwise. This
view has the virtue of providing substantial protection for individual
employees while recognizing that there may be circumstances in

87. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 396.
88. Austin and Gardner-Denver involved arbitration agreements that contained their own
anti-discrimination provisions. In Gardner-Denver, the waiver of Title VII rights was invalid. 415
U.S. at 51. In Austin the plaintiff was required to arbitrate her statutory claim. 78 F. 3d at 877.
89. 959 F. Supp. 569 (1997).

083]

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

99

which the concerns expressed in Gardner-Denver and Barrantine are
irrelevant or inapplicable. 90

Thus, the Almonte court rejected the per se rule in Austin91 on its way
to find the middle ground. Moreover, the Supreme Court may be trying
to move toward this middle ground by distinguishing Gardner-Denver
and Gilmer and limiting the Gilmer decision. It is as if the Supreme
Court wants the two decisions, and now three with Wright, to stand
side-by-side as legal precedent in order to enforce valid arbitration
agreements, yet, at the same time, protect individual rights.
H. Courts' Concerns Regarding Arbitration Agreements

The use of the "clear and unmistakable" standard reflects another
concern courts have when deciding the validity of an arbitration
agreement. The Ninth Circuit has indicated its intent to protect
employees from compulsory arbitration, defining compulsory
arbitration as occurring "when individuals must sign an agreement
waiving their rights to litigate future claims in a judicial forum in order
to obtain employment with, or continue to work for the employer. " 92
Many securities forms have traditionally fallen into this category,
however, after much pressure from plaintiffs, civil rights groups, and
Congress, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) will
no longer require its securities industry employees to arbitrate statutory
employment discrimination claims. 93 Employment discrimination claims
in violation of the statute will be eligible for arbitration only where the
parties agree to arbitration after the claim has arisen. 94
While the Court in Wright did not address additional arbitration
requirements, some courts have placed other restrictions on arbitration
agreements. This should come as a word of caution to employers and
employees. For example, to maintain the validity of arbitration clauses,
employers are sometimes required to ensure that arbitration agreements
do not reflect an unfair slant in favor of the employer's interests. 95 In
Stirlen v. Supercuts Inc. ,% California's Court of Appeals held that an
90. /d. at 574 (quoting Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141, 147 n.6
(D. Conn. 1993)).
91. Almonte, 959 F. Supp. At 569.
92. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Stephen
T. Davenport, Jr., Are Employment Dispute Arbitration Agreements Valid?, (visited Dec. 1, 1999)
<http: I!www.laborcounse/. com > .
93. See supra discussion note 2.
94. /d.
95. Stirlen v. Supercuts Inc., 50 Cal. App. 1519 (4th Dist. 1997). See also Davenport,
supra note 92.
96. 50 Cal. App. 1519 (4th Dist. 1997).
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arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it favored the
employer's rights over those of the employee and limited several of the
employee's rights, as well. The agreement provided for the employee to
resolve all employment-related disputes by means of arbitration, while
the employer could use a judicial forum to enforce issues of
confidentiality, trade secrets, and patent rights. 97 The Stir/en decision,
in holding that such an employer-employee relationship was
unconscionable, cited the United States Department of Labor's
Commission on the Future Worker-Management Relations which set
out guidelines for employee arbitration agreements. These guidelines
include providing for:
(1) a neutral arbitrator;

(2) a fair and simple method of securing information necessary for the
employee to present his or her claim;
(3) a fair cost-sharing system;
(4) the right to independent representation;
(5) a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation;
(6) a written opinion of the arbitrator with the rationale used to obtain
the result; and
(7) sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent with
governing laws. 98

All of these guidelines reflect concerns some courts have with the
arbitration process and indicate an effort to protect individual rights
where arbitration is enforced.
Courts also use these factors to decide that arbitration provided a
sufficient means of addressing statutory claims. Specifically, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court in Cole v. Bums International
Security Services99 found that an arbitration agreement providing for
neutral arbitrators, more than minimal discovery, a written reward, all
types of relief that would be available in court, and protection against
unreasonable arbitrators fees or related expenses.
By setting guidelines such as those mentioned above, in addition to
requiring background disclosures for arbitrators prior to their being

97. !d.
98. !d.
99. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). These guidelines are also of concern to the Supreme
Court as suggested by their use in Gilmer. See also John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson,
Employment Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 1997 at 3.
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selected, the courts can help protect against incompetent arbitrators
making important decisions regarding individual statutory rights. For
this reason, it has been suggested, by some observers, that there be
judicial review for arbitration decisions. 100 Perhaps de novo review
would not be appropriate, but proponents suggest that some kind of
judicial review is necessary.
These guidelines raise additional concerns regarding arbitration
agreements. In short, some courts are concerned with the quality and
neutrality of arbitrators, the insufficient discovery that often takes
place, whether the arbitrator's decision is put in writing, whether
sufficient remedies are available, and that employees often have to pay
excessive arbitrators fees and expenses. Finally, as previously stated,
some courts and parties are concerned about the lack of judicial review
that arbitration decisions can draw on. 101 In light of these concerns, it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court in Wright held that a general
arbitration clause did not require an employee to arbitrate alleged ADA
violations because from the contract's language, it was not "clear and
unmistakable" that Wright would waive his statutory right to a judicial
forum by signing the contract. 102
V. CONCLUSION

Although Wright did shed additional light on arbitration
agreements, questions remain unanswered and it would be foolish to
rely entirely on this decision in creating, signing, or arguing a claim for
or against a mandatory arbitration agreement. Instead, factors such as
whether the contract was a CBA, the specificity of the contract
language used, whether uneven bargaining power existed in the creation
of the contract, and similar issues should be considered. The Court's
narrow construction of the issue specifically addressed whether the
signing of a general arbitration agreement embodied within a
collectively-negotiated employment contract constituted a waiver of the
right to take a claim of an alleged ADA violation to a judicial forum.
Simply put, the Court decided that generally worded arbitration
provisions are not enough to constitute a "clear and unmistakable"
waiver of the right to resolve a statutory claim in a judicial forum.

100. See Robert J. Fitzpatrick, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., the Death Knell
for Alexander v. Gardner-Denver?, A.L.I.,*llO (July 23, 1998).
101. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (regarding
arbitrators' fees concerns);. See Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management Inc., 966 F.
Supp 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (regarding judicial review concerns). See also John P. Furfaro &
Maury B. Josephson, Employment Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 1997 at 3.
102. See Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 396.
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Thus, under the narrow construction of the issue, the general language
in arbitration agreements is not sufficient to constitute a waiver, and
that the "clear and unmistakable" standard should apply to collectivebargaining agreements and union-negotiated rights, but not necessarily
to individually-negotiated rights, as was the case in Gilmer. Moreover,
there are a number of issues that the Court did not consider in Wright,
but that employers, employees, and courts must often wrestle with
where arbitration agreements are concerned. In answering these
difficult questions, the parties involved, and particularly the courts,
should remember that Gilmer did not overrule Gardner-Denver and that
both decisions have their place within employment and labor law.
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